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Introduction
There is an ongoing and controversial public debate on the relatively low tax payments of large companies. In the period 2008-2015, the statutory corporate tax rate in the US was 35 percent. However, the most pro table companies out of the Fortune 500 paid on average an e ective tax rate of only 21.2 percent on their pro ts (Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, 2017) . Typical explanations for this observation are pro t shifting of large multinational rms (Desai et al. , 2006; Gumpert et al. , 2016; Davies et al. , 2018) and better coordinated lobbying activities (Bombardini, 2008; Richter et al. , 2009) .
In this paper, we provide a new explanation why the ratio of tax payments to pre-tax pro ts (the e ective tax rate) is smaller for larger rms. We show that this result can even emerge in a closed-economy framework without pro t-shifting or lobbying activities. All we need for our argument is that mark-ups are endogenous and production costs are only partially tax deductible. While existing studies explain lower e ective tax rates of large rms by legal or even illegal tax evasion, our study ties this fact to the underlying demand structure in the market. To the best of our knowledge this explanation for low tax payments of large rms is novel. We argue that this channel should be taken into account in empirical research and in the debate on policy measures addressing tax evasion.
To derive our results, we introduce tax policy in a general equilibrium model with rm heterogeneity and endogenous mark-ups following Melitz & Ottaviano (2008) . Tax policy is determined by two instruments: a tax rate on pro ts and a share of production costs that is tax deductible. These measures have been used in recent tax-rate-cut-cum-base-broadening reforms.
1 In our framework with linear demand, corporate tax rates reduce mark-ups and hence pre-tax pro ts which holds in particular for high cost rms. At the same time, these rms can only deduct a fraction of their large production costs. As a consequence, the ratio of tax payments to pre-tax pro ts is larger compared to low cost rms even in the absence of common explanations such as pro t shifting or lobbying. Interestingly, our model is also able to provide a rationale for a positive relation between rm size and e ective tax payments as found in some empirical studies. This case occurs if production costs are subsidized by the government.
Importantly, this result hinges on the demand structure that features endogenous markups. Empirical evidence shows indeed that more productive rms charge higher mark-ups (De Loecker & Warzynski, 2012; Bellone et al. , 2016) . However, the existing literature on rm heterogeneity and corporate taxation typically builds on CES preferences. In such a framework prices are set as a constant mark-up over marginal costs and our result would not emerge as rms perfectly pass on taxes to consumers: a 1% increase of the corporate tax rate leads to a 1% increase in prices.
2 In our model with linear demand, there is only imperfect pass-through of taxes into prices which reduces mark-ups. As high cost rms face more price sensitive consumers they respond stronger to changes in tax policy. Consequently, the tax burden relative to pre-tax pro ts increases more for small rms with lower productivity. In the public debate, globalization is perceived as an important driving force for the heterogeneity in e ective tax rates across rms as it facilitates pro t-shifting of large companies. We provide a new explanation for this observation by showing how general equilibrium effects change the e ective tax payments of heterogeneous rms. Shocks which a ect mark-ups through the toughness of competition, such as trade liberalization, reinforce the heterogeneity in relative tax payments across rms. The reason behind this result is that a larger market enhances rm entry which at the same time increases competition and hence, compresses mark-ups in particular for small rms.
Our paper is related to recent research that analyzes tax competition for internationally mobile rms that di er in their productivity (Baldwin & Okubo, 2009; Davies & Eckel, 2010; Krautheim & Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2011; Hau er & St• ahler, 2013) . The focus of these papers is to explain how countries of varying size optimally set tax policy and how heterogeneous rms select into these countries. Related to our paper, Bauer & Langenmayr (2013) provide a di erent rationale for the fact that large multinational rms pay relatively low taxes. They show that pro t taxation under the ruling arm's length principle allows most productive rms to shift pro ts abroad even under full compliance with the tax code. In contrast, we show that the relatively low e ective tax rates of large rms can be explained even in a closed-economy setting without pro t shifting. Bauer et al. (2014) show that endogenous tax policy in a model with rm heterogeneity represents an additional adjustment to trade liberalization. In contrast to our work, this literature typically builds on a CES demand structure and hence, does not capture our result which requires mark-ups to be rm-speci c and endogenous.
3 Egger et al. (2018) highlight an alternative explanation for low e ective tax rates of large multinationals that can threat to relocate production which increases their bargaining power with tax authorities. Our paper is also related to empirical studies on the relation between the e ective tax rate and rm size. In a recent survey, Belz et al. (2018) document con icting results on this relationship. Following the accounting literature, there are two competing theories that explain this ambiguity. The political power theory assumes that larger rms have more resources to in uence policy making in their favor which implies a lower e ective tax rate for large rms. In contrast, the political cost theory states that large companies face stronger exposure to regulations which leads to a positive relation between rm size and the e ective tax rate. We contribute to this literature by adding an alternative explanation which arises from the interaction of the tax system and the market structure.
The model
We introduce corporate taxes in a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous rms that follows the lines of Melitz & Ottaviano (2008) . Importantly, our model features linear demand leading to endogenous mark-ups. Throughout our study, we highlight novel results that are speci c to the demand system and contrast them to an alternative framework with CES preferences where mark-ups would be constant (see Appendix).
In a rst step, we introduce tax policy which is determined by two instruments: a tax rate on pro ts and a share of production costs that is tax deductible. Following this, we derive consumer demand and optimal rm behavior to nally characterize a free entry equilibrium. This setting allows us to derive our main result which shows relative tax payments as a function of rm productivity. Moreover, we conduct comparative static exercises with respect to changes in tax policy as well as globalization, and analyze the e ects on the e ective tax rate at the rm level.
Consumers
We consider an economy that is endowed with L consumers each holding one unit of capital which is the sole production factor. Consumers maximize utility over a continuum of di erentiated varieties indexed by i 2 ; and a homogenous outside good q c 0 which is chosen as numeraire. The utility is given by:
The parameter indexes the degree of product di erentiation between the varieties. The extreme case of = 0 implies that products are perfectly substitutable and hence, consumers only care about their total level of consumption given by
Moreover, and determine the substitutability between the outside good and the di erentiated varieties. Utility maximization of Eq. (1) subject to the budget constraint leads to the following linear inverse demand function:
In a next step, we derive direct market demand q i by aggregating demand of L consumers:
We de ne as the subset of varieties that are actually consumed (i.e. q i > 0). This subset consists of a total number of N varieties whose average price is given by p = (1=N ) R i2 p i di. Inspection of Eq. (3) shows that demand for variety i falls to zero if
This is an important di erence to CES demand systems and implies that the price elasticity
is not constant and is not uniquely determined by the degree of product di erentiation . Eq. (4) shows that tougher competition (increase in N or decrease in p) increases the price elasticity for a given price level p i .
Firm behavior
Producing one unit of the numeraire good q 0 requires one unit of capital as an input. We assume that the market for this good is perfectly competitive and it is sold at a price p 0 = 1: These assumptions x the returns to capital to unity. The di erentiated sector is characterized by monopolistic competition. Firms pay xed costs f E to enter the market and draw marginal costs c from a distribution G (c) with support on [0; c M ]. Hence, the productivity of a rm is determined by 1 c . Firms only learn about their cost level after incurring the xed entry costs. Given that the payment of f E is sunk, all rms that can cover their marginal cost and generate positive after-tax pro ts survive and produce.
Before we derive optimal rm behavior, we characterize the tax system in the economy. We follow Bauer et al. (2014) and assume that the government has two policy instruments: i) the tax rate t and ii) a tax deductibility parameter < 1. The latter determines the tax base which is given by the rm's revenue less a tax-deductible share of the variable production costs. We assume that tax revenues are redistributed to consumers.
5 Given this tax regime, the after-tax pro ts (c) of a rm with cost draw c are given by
We rewrite Eq. (5) as follows:
where we denote =
as the tax factor. Throughout our analysis, we assume a partial deductibility of production costs < 1 implying that the tax factor is larger than one and rises in the corporate tax rate. Eq. (6) shows that the tax factor enters multiplicative with production costs and hence, represents the e ective cost of capital in our framework.
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In this case, tax policy has allocative consequences. Note that > 1 would imply that production costs are subsidized by the government such that < 1.
7 We will also discuss the implications of this case below. Given the existence of a choke price p max , all rms with e ective costs c larger than p max have to exit the market. 8 We denote c D as the cost draw of a rm that just breaks even and is indi erent between serving or exiting the market, i.e. p max = c D .
9 Following the analysis of Melitz & Ottaviano (2008) , all rm performance measures can now be written as a function of the cost draw c and the cost cuto c D . Importantly, the latter variable is determined endogenously in general equilibrium and depends both on the average price p as well as the number of rms N in the economy. Firm performance measures are given by:
6 Remember that the returns to capital are exogenous due to the existence of the outside sector and are equal to unity.
7 Throughout our analysis we assume parameter values such that > 0. 8 In comparison to frameworks with CES preferences (e.g. Melitz, 2003) there is no need for any xed costs to derive rm exits.
9 The underlying assumption is that c M > c D which implies that some rms are exiters.
whereas (c) = p (c)
c denotes the mark-up of a rm with cost c. More productive rms set lower prices and earn higher revenues as well as pro ts than less productive rms. Importantly, and in contrast to a framework with CES preferences, more productive rms do not pass on all of their lower production costs to consumers but set higher mark-ups than rms with higher costs. Firm performance measures in Eqs. (7)- (10) are a ected by tax policy in two ways: i) a direct e ect through and ii) an indirect e ect via changes of the cost cuto c D . We discuss these general equilibrium e ects in the next section.
Free entry and equilibrium
The equilibrium is determined by two conditions. Following Eq. (4), the zero pro t condition relates the cost cuto c D = p max to the endogenous number of rms and is given by:
whereas the average price is p =
, and average costs can be written as
cdG (c). Rearranging Eq. (11) allows us to write the number of available varieties as a function of the cost cuto c D :
At the entry stage, rms pay xed entry costs f E and draw a cost parameter c from the distribution G(c). We assume that a fraction of entry costs is tax deductible. Free entry ensures that expected after-tax pro ts are equal to the non-deductible part of xed entry costs which leads to a second condition:
To solve our model, we assume that productivity draws 
with = 2 (k + 1) (k + 2) (c M ) k f E . A higher tax factor clearly reduces c D , as e ective marginal production costs increase, which forces the least productive rms to exit:
Hence, we observe that an increase in the tax factor a ects high cost rms more than low costs rms. The reason is that consumers of high cost varieties react more price sensitive than consumers of low cost varieties. This implies that following an increase in the tax factor high cost producers have to restrict mark-ups and quantities more than low cost producers. This can be seen by the derivative of Eq. (9):
The rst term in Eq. (16) is positive and increases in the cost di erence relative to the marginal producer in the market. As rms exit, the number of varieties in Eq. (12) decreases and competition is reduced. Hence, market shares are reallocated towards remaining producers. The second e ect is negative and shows the decrease in the cost cuto as discussed above. For the rm with cost draw c = 1+k 2+k
c D the two e ects exactly o set each other, i.e. all rms with c < c (c > c ) expand (reduce) outputs. For the marginal rm with c = c D only the second e ect occurs. The same intuition holds for mark-ups and pro ts. These results will be central for the main implications of our study.
Tax payments of heterogeneous rms
In this section, we derive the e ective tax rate to address the observed pattern that large rms pay relatively low taxes. Common explanations for this fact include pro t shifting of large multinational rms (Desai et al. , 2006; Gumpert et al. , 2016; Davies et al. , 2018) and better coordinated lobbying activities (Bombardini, 2008; Richter et al. , 2009 ). In our framework, we show that the result of relatively low tax payments of large rms arises even in a closed economy setting without multinational rms and in the absence of lobbying. As we will argue in the following, the reason for this result is the interaction of tax policy with the underlying demand structure that allows mark-ups to be endogenous.
We de ne the ratio of a rm's tax payments relative to pre-tax pro ts (e ective tax rate):
After inserting the equilibrium price Eq. (7), we obtain:
Taking the derivative of Eq. (18) with respect to the cost parameter c leads to:
Proposition 1 In a model with linear demand and partial deductibility of production costs, the ratio of tax payments to pre-tax pro ts (e ective tax rate) is lower for larger rms, whereas this ratio is constant across rms with CES-demand.
Proof. See Appendix. Proposition 1 shows that the relationship between production costs and relative tax payments is positive if there is both imperfect cost pass-through into prices and partial tax deductibility of production costs. If one requirement is not met, the ratio is constant and independent of production costs. With linear demand, there is imperfect cost pass-through. Firms with higher marginal costs c charge higher prices and earn lower mark-ups. If < 1, only a fraction of this cost disadvantage is deductible, such that the ratio (c) increases in production costs c. Only with full deductibility ( = 1), the e ective tax rate is constant across rms. In the Appendix, we show that with CES-demand, the ratio does not depend on rm size. In this case, prices are set as a constant mark-up over marginal production costs and there is perfect pass-through of taxes into consumer prices.
Empirical studies nd evidence for both a positive and a negative relation between rm size and e ective tax rates (Belz et al. , 2018) . Note that our framework is exible enough to integrate both views. If production costs are subsidized (i.e. > 1) the result in Proposition 1 is reversed and our model predicts a positive relationship between rm size and the e ective tax rate. Again, this result would not emerge in a CES framework.
One alternative explanation for the negative relationship between rm size and the effective tax rate is pro t shifting of multinationals. The latter have been found to be larger and more productive than domestic rms (Helpman et al. , 2004; Yeaple, 2009 ) and use tax havens more extensively (Desai et al. , 2006) . In Krautheim & Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2011) the use of tax havens is associated with additional xed costs such that only more productive producers shift pro ts abroad. However, we show that in a framework with endogenous mark-ups, the more productive rms pay lower e ective tax rates even without pro t shifting. We argue, that this additional channel should be taken into account when evaluating the implications of tax policy across countries because otherwise the e ects of tax evasion would be overstressed. A similar argument applies to the evaluation of lobbying activities.
The relationship between e ective tax rates and rm size is also a ected by economy-wide shocks. As discussed in the trade literature, we can evaluate these shocks through changes in the cost cuto c D as a su cient statistic. Melitz & Ottaviano (2008) show that an increase in market size L has the same implications as trade liberalization and reduces the cost cuto c D . Both shocks increase expected pro ts which induces rm entry and hence, existing rms face stronger competition. As a consequence, high cost rms have to exit the market. As a second shock, we consider an increase in the tax factor , which could be caused by an increase in the tax rate t or a decrease in the share of deductible costs . A higher tax factor especially hurts high cost rms and reduces the cost cuto c D as shown in Eq. (15).
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A change in the cost cuto a ects the e ective tax rate as follows:
We also show that this change becomes stronger for high-cost rms as:
We summarize our results as follows:
Proposition 2 In a model with linear demand and partial deductibility of production costs, the ratio of tax payments to pre-tax pro ts increases with trade liberalization and the market size. This increase is stronger for smaller rms.
In the public debate, globalization is perceived as an important driving force for the heterogeneity in e ective tax rates across rms as it facilitates pro t-shifting of large companies. We provide a new explanation how globalization increases the di erence in relative tax payments across rms, even in the absence of pro t shifting and lobbying activities. Trade liberalization increases the toughness of competition which reduces mark-ups especially for smaller rms. This channel has been extensively studied in the recent trade literature, but has received less attention in the public nance literature. Accounting for these competition e ects is crucial to evaluate the implications of pro t shifting and tax evasion.
10 The derivative of Eq. (14) with respect to market size L is given by:
Conclusion
Our model has shown that the negative relationship between relative tax payments and rm size is not necessarily an indication for pro t shifting or the use of tax havens. We argue that a tax system which allows for a partial deductibility of production costs in combination with heterogeneous rms could generate such a result when mark-ups are endogenous. This should be taken into account by policy makers aiming at reducing the use of tax havens as it is not clear to what extent the negative relation between tax payments and rm size is due to such activities. To evaluate the costs and bene ts of policy measures, it is important to disentangle the di erent channels which cause the comparatively low tax payments of large companies. In this context, controlling for competition e ects of tax policy is a challenge for future empirical work.
Moreover, we have shown an additional channel how globalization reinforces the heterogeneity in e ective tax burdens across rms. This implies that globalization does not only facilitate pro t shifting as shown by the existing literature, but also leads to pro-competitive e ects which interact with tax policy.
Our model provides a rationale for di erences of e ective tax rates across heterogeneous rms in a very tractable way. This framework could be extended in several dimensions related to optimal tax policy, tax competition, and country asymmetries. We hope that our analysis encourages future work on the interaction of tax policy and pro-competitive e ects.
Appendix: Model with CES preferences
In this section, we show that our main result does not emerge in a CES framework. Suppose that preferences are given by:
whereas is the set of di erentiated varieties and > 1 denotes the constant elasticity of substitution across varieties. Consumer maximization yields the following demand:
whereas P denotes the aggregate price index. Firms maximize pro ts in Eq. (6) subject to demand (23), which leads to the optimal price p(c) = 1 c;
which is a constant mark-up over e ective marginal production costs. Computing the ratio of tax payments relative to pre-tax pro ts as in Eq. (17), leads to:
Hence, in a CES framework the ratio of tax payments relative to pre-tax pro ts is independent of rm productivity in contrast to Proposition 1. Additionally, it does not depend on general equilibrium e ects and thus is not able to explain our result in Proposition 2.
